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Your search for [author]Keefer, Philip returned 10 records. |
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Bureaucratic delegation and political institutions : when are independent central banks irrelevantn.
by Keefer, Philip; Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2000.
Subject: Banks and banking, Central; Banks and banking, Central -- Econometric models; Inflation (Finance); Monetary Policy.
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Polarization, politics and property rights : links between inequality and growth.
by Keefer, Philip; Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2000.
Subject: Income distribution; Right of property; Equality.
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Checks and balances, private information, and the credibility of monetary commitments.
by Keefer, Philip.; Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2001.
Subject: Banks and banking, Central; Inflation (Finance).
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Boondoggles and expropriation : rent-seeking and policy distortion when property rights are insecure.
by Keefer, Philip; Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2002.
Subject: Right of property; Rent (Economic theory); Eminent domain.
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Democracy, credibility, and clientelism.
by Keefer, Philip; Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2005.
Subject: Democracy; Patron and client; Truthfulness and falsehood; Policy sciences.
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Social polarization, political institutions, and country creditworthiness.
by Keefer, Philip.; Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2002.
Subject: Country risk; Credit ratings; Polarization (Social sciences); Ethnic relations.
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What does political economy tell us about economic development and vice versan.
by Keefer, Philip; Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2004.
Subject: Economic development; Decision making; Separation of powers.
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When do special interests run rampantn: disentangling the role of elections, incomplete information, and checks and balances in banking crises.
by Keefer, Philip.; Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2001.
Subject: Financial crises -- Mathematical models; Banks and banking -- Political aspects -- Mathematical models; Fiscal policy -- Mathematical models.
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A review of the political economy of governance : from property rights to voice.
by Keefer, Philip; [Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2004.
Subject: Corporate governance; Public administration.
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Elections, special interests, and the fiscal costs of financial crisis.
by Keefer, Philip; Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2004.
Subject: Elections; Financial crises; Fiscal policy.
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